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Aviation Terms
ACARS: ARINC communications and address reporting system: digital communications system
used primarily for aircraft-to-airline messages
ARINC: Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
ASRS: aviation safety reporting system: aviation incident reporting system run by NASA for FAA
ATC: air traffic control
ATIS: automated terminal information service: recorded voice message that provides weather and
airport services information
CDU: control display unit: pilots' interface to the FMS
CRM: cockpit resource management
DME: distance measuring equipment: ground navigational aid that can provide display of distance
to selected ground navigational radio transmitter
EFIS: electronic flight instrument system
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAR: Federal Aviation Regulations: federal rules under which flight operations are conducted
Fix: position in space usually on aircraft's flight plan
FL 310: for example, FL310 is an altitude 31,000 ft. above sea level; used for altitudes above
18,000 ft
flight mode annunciator: display on or near the PFDs of the current modes of autoflightFMA :
system
FMC:
FMS:
flight-management computer
flight-management system
FO: first officer
GPWS: ground proximity warning system: warns of inadequate separation from ground and
excessive sink rate close to ground
IAS: indicated airspeed
ILS: instrument landing system: uses precision localizer and glide-slope radio transmitters near a
runway to provide landing approach guidance
LNAV: lateral navigation: provides computer description of aircraft's planned lateral flight path
that can be tracked by the autoflight system; lateral path can be shown on map display.
MCP: mode-control panel: pilots' interface to the autoflight system; usually located centrally just
below cockpit glare shield
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PF: pilot-flying
PFD: primary flight display
PNF: pilot-not-flying
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PPOS: present position
RNAV: area navigation: generic acronym for any device capable of aircraft guidance between
pilot-defined waypoints
VNAV: vertical navigation: provides computer description of aircraft's speed and altitude that can
be tracked by autoflight system
VOR: very-high-frequency omnidirectional radio range: ground navigational aid that can provide
display of aircraft position relative to course through selected ground navigational radio transmitter
Waypoint: position in space usually on aircraft's flight plan
Cognitive Science Terms
Action: goal directed behavior performed by an agent
Agent: any system component that executes tasks that process information
Attention allocation: process by which an agent samples information on media in the environment
Cognitive tasks: tasks that achieve their goals by processing information
Distraction: an event that causes attention to move away from task to which agent should continue
to attend
Distributed cognition: term used to emphasize that cognitive tasks that are important to
performance at system level are distributed across various people in the system and various
artifacts and machines
Error-resistant system: system designed to minimize occurrence of errors
Error-tolerant system: system that can detect errors and correct them before they result in
undesirable consequences
Expectation: representation of a state predicted to occur in a given situation; agents can compare
expectations to what actually happens and thereby detect possible processing errors
information: describes the relation between a structure (in the world) and some agent that
interprets that structure; world is full of structure, but the only structures that are informative are
those capable of affecting the behavior of the agent that is interpreting those structures
Information processing: tasks that depending on the situation, transform information represented
in one medium to information represented in a different medium
Media: any physical things that can be used to represent information
Mediated information: information that has been transformed from its primary source
Mistake: an error in which the executed action is the intended action but the intended action is
incorrect
Representation: structure in the world used to express information on a medium
Slip: an error in which the executed action is not the intended action
Side Effect: change in a machine state that is a byproduct of an agent using the machine to
accomplish some task
Task: actions accomplished by agents to satisfy goals
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SUMMARY
Pilot reports of aviation incidents to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provide a
window on the problems occurring in today's airline cockpits. The narratives of 10 pilot reports of
errors made in the automation-assisted altitude-change task are used to illustrate some of the issues
associated with pilot and automatic-systems interactions. These narratives are then used to
construct a description of the cockpit as an information processing system. Describing the cockpit
as a single information processing system is useful because the system behaviors of interest are not
determined solely by the behavior of the humans in the system. Altitude deviations in transport
aircraft are usually the result of several small problems. The information processing analysis also
highlights the variety of languages and media used in the cockpit to describe the flight path as
clearance information is processed by the cockpit system. The analysis concentrates on the error-
tolerant properties of the system and on how breakdowns can occasionally occur. An error-tolerant
system can detect and correct its internal processing errors. The cockpit system consists of two or
three pilots supported by autoflight, flight-management, and alerting systems. These humans and
machines have distributed access to clearance information and perform redundant processing of
information. Errors can be detected as deviations from either expected behavior or as deviations
from expected information. Breakdowns in this system can occur when the checking and cross-
checking tasks that give the system its error-tolerant properties are not performed because of
distractions or other task demands. The report concludes with recommendations based on the
analysis for improving the error tolerance of the cockpit system.
INTRODUCTION
One objective of NASA's Aviation Safety/Automation program is to develop error-tolerant
systems that can detect errors and correct them before they result in undesired consequences. In
attempting to design systems that are more error-tolerant, it is useful to examine and account for
the impressive error-tolerant properties of today's aviation system. This report examines the error-
tolerant properties of the very common aviation task of changing altitude. Our approach is to
study pilot reports to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) of breakdowns in this
normally error-tolerant task. These reports are used to assemble a composite description of the
flight deck as an information processing system. We use the system description to show why the
current system is so robust in the face of seemingly high error rates. The report emphasis is on the
effect of increased cockpit automation - for aircraft navigation, guidance, and control in the
current generation of glass cockpit airliners- on the type of altitude deviations reported by pilots.
Aircraft in controlled airspace are cleared by air traffic controllers to fly at specific altitudes. Pilots
are given clearances such as "NASA 1003, descend and maintain one one thousand feet." On
accepting this clearance, the pilot is expected to descend without delay to 11,000 ft. and then
maintain11,000ft. It is importantfor pilots toadhereaccuratelyto altitudeclearancesbecausea
primarymethodair-trafficcontrollersuseto keepaircraftfromcolliding is to assignthemto
differentaltitudes.Theseassignedaltitudesareusuallyat least! ,000ft. apart.
Thethreetypesof altitudedeviationsare(1)anundershoot, in which the aircraft levels off
before reaching the assigned altitude; (2) an overshoot, in which the aircraft levels off after
reaching the assigned altitude; and (3) a deviation in which the aircraft levels off at the assigned
altitude but later deviates from the assigned altitude without clearance. The tolerance for achieving
and maintaining an assigned altitude is 300 ft. Another kind of altitude clearance is a crossing
restriction. For example, "NASA1003, cross SUNOL at or below eight thousand feet." An
altitude deviation can also occur if an aircraft does not climb or descend quickly enough to meet a
crossing restriction. Pilots can be cited by the FAA for failing to adhere to a clearance and can
receive a warning, have a fine imposed, or have their licenses suspended.
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Figure 1. Typical glass cockpit displays and controls used in the altitude-change task.
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A surprisinglycomplexsystemof peopleandequipmentis involvedin performingand
monitoringthetaskof changingaltitude1in anairlinetransportaircraft. Thealtitude-changetask
usuallybeginswith aradiocall fromtheair-trafficcontrollerto theaircraftcrewrequestingthat
theychangeto a newaltitude. Onepilot--usually thepilot-not-flying(PNF)---handiesthetaskof
communicatingwith air-trafficcontrol(ATC). ThePNFreceivesthenewclearanceandreadsit
backto theair-trafficcontrollerwhomonitorsthe"read-back"for communicationerrors;oneof the
pilotsthenentersthenewaltitudeinto thealtitudealerter.2 Thefunctionof thealtitudealerteris to
alerttheflight crewwhentheaircraftis approachingthetargetaltitudeandto alertthecrewof
deviationsfrom thetargetaltitudeof morethanafew hundredfeet. All alertsaresignaledby a
light nextto thealtimeter.Deviationsfrom thespecifiedaltitudealsotriggeranauralalert. Some
aircraftalsohaveanauralalertthatsoundswhentheaircraftclimbsor descendsto within 900ft. of
thespecifiedaltitudein orderto remindthecrewthattheaircraftis approachingthenewaltitude.3
Thevaluesetin thealtitudewindowis alsothetargetaltitudefor theautopilot. If thenew
altitudeis lower thantheaircraft'spresentaltitude,thepilot flying canmanuallyreduceengine
powerandinitiate thedescent,or usetheautoflightsystem4to makethealtitudechange.In either
case,thepilots shouldremainawareof altitudeduringtheclimbor descento thenewaltitude. At
1,000ft. beforethenewaltitude,atypicalairlineprocedureis for thePNFto makeaverbalcall of
"one thousandto go" or "out of twelvefor eleven."At 900ft. beforethenewaltitude,thealtitude-
alertlight illuminates.Approachingthenewaltitude,thepilot-flying (PF)or theautoflightsystem
levelstheaircraftandadjustsenginepowerto maintainspeed.Thecontrollercanmonitorthe
aircraft'saltitudeon thegroundradardisplay.Theair-trafficcontrolleralsohasa systemthat
monitorseachaircraft'saltitudeandalertsthecontrollertodeviationsfrom assignedaltitudes.5
Figure 1illustratesthetypicalcontrolsanddisplaysin aglasscockpitairlinerthatcanbeused
duringanaltitudechange;Figure2 is atime-lineof typicalevents.Figure3 isa diagramof the
possiblepathsoverwhich informationcanflow betweenthepeopleandequipmenthatmakeup
thesystemthatperformsthealtitude-changetask. 6 Breakdowns and errors in changing altitude
will be illustrated with pilot narratives from the ASRS.
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is an incident reporting system run by NASA
for the FAA. ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily by pilots and controllers. Pilots have two
principal motivations for submitting ASRS reports describing errors and incidents in which they
have been involved: first, responsible pilots may have a desire to report a safety problem so that it
can be avoided in the future; and second, the FAA has agreed to grant pilots who file reports
limited immunity from legal actions that might have been brought as a consequence of the incident
described in the report. Since all reports are voluntarily submitted, there are fundamental problems
with any attempt to conduct statistical analyses of the reported incidents. About all that can be
concluded with certainty is that these reports indicate that at least some minimum number of
different kinds of incidents have occurred. The key strength of ASRS incident reports is that they
provide examples of the kinds of errors and incidents that are occurring in the aviation system.
The ASRS office states in its standard cover letter that accompanies all reports that "We believe that
IA blow-by-blow description of pilot activity during the initial part of a normal altitude change is contained in
Hutchins and Klausen (1992).
2See Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91-165 for specifications of the altitude-alerter.
3Altitude alerters in Boeing airplanes such as the B-757/767 signal the crew 900 ft. before the target altitude; in
Douglas airplanes such as the DC-9/MD-80 the alert margin is 700 ft; in Airbus aircraft, the margin is 700 ft.
4 The term "autoflight" refers to the combined autopilot and autothrottle system.
5This ground system is part of the "Operational Error Detection Program." Pilots commonly refer to this system as
The Snitch.
6 See also Degani, Chappell, and Hayes (1991) for a similar diagram of information flow.
therealpowerof ASRSlies in thereportnarratives.Herepilots,controllers,andotherstell us
aboutaviationsafetyincidentsandsituationsin detail. Theyexplainwhathappened,andmore
importantly,why it happened."
For thisstudy,a requestwasmadeto theASRSofficefor reports7of altitude-deviation
incidentsfrom airlinepilotsof conventional-technologyandthenewer,moreautomatedglass
cockpitaircraft, Examplesof thetypeof aircraftin theconventionalcockpitsamplearetheB-727,
B-737-100,B-737-200,B-747-200,DC-9,andDC-10. Examplesof thetypeof aircraft in the
glasscockpitcategoryaretheB-747-400,B-757,B-767,MD-88,A-310,andA-320. Theseglass
Cockpitaircraftareequippedwith flight-managementcomputersystemsandsophisticatedautoflight
systems.TheASRSincidentreportsdonotprovideenoughinformationto identify reliablythe
exactmakeandmodelof theaircraft. In thispaper,wewill identify themonly asconventionalor
glasscockpitaircraft.
ATC
Controller
Pilot
Not
Flying
Pilot
Flying
Altitude
Alert
System
18,000
"NASA 1003.
Descend and maintain .....
one one thousand feet."
"NASA 1003, "Twelve
Is out of eighteen for eleven."
thousand for one
one thousand feet."
Setto 11000
"One to go." .
Light ON--.- ..... . .
LigmOFP-: : : _ - ....
1:_;_0oii:i ;o00 ....
Figure 2. Time-line of events during the altitude-change task.
APPROACH
A one-page coding form was developed that allowed the ASRS incidents to be described in
terms of the factors that were present in the incident. In the initial part of this study, this form was
completed for altitude-deviations reports from the pilots of 50 conventional-cockpit and 50 glass
cockpit aircraft. The factors and their definitions are shown in Table 1.
Examples of ASRS narratives that illustrate the trends observed in this collection of altitude-
deviations incidents are provided in a subsequent section. They are described in terms of recent
7 ASRS incident reports are publicly available.
4
resultsin thefieldsof human-computer interaction and cognitive science. The incidents are then
used to construct a descriptive model of the information flow in the error-tolerant human-machine
system that performs and monitors the altitude-change task. The report concludes with
recommendations for procedures for the altitude-change task and for future equipment design.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Like the results of other ASRS studies of altitude deviations (Factors... 1977; Billings and
Cheaney 1981), the factors in this sample of altitude-deviation incidents could be attributed either
to a failure in information transfer or to a distraction from checking and cross-checking tasks.
There were also several altitude-deviation reports that mentioned or implied that inexperience in
operating the autopilot or flight-management systems was a factor. Table 2 presents a count of the
factors that contributed to each reported altitude-deviation incident in the sample. Up to five of the
factors in Table 1 were assigned to each incident.
Figure 3. Potential information flow paths during the altitude-change task.
Table 1. Factors Used to Describe Altitude-Deviation Incidents
CDU/FMS programming .......... a problem programming the FMC
Emergency system ................. aircraft system malfunctioning
In-flight training .................... one pilot training another pilot
Lack of knowledge ................. problem caused by lack of knowledge about
system operation
High workload ...................... distraction caused by high workload
Complex flight path ................ problem owing to the complexity of the flight
path
Aircraft system problem ........... malfunction of some aircraft equipment
Weather .............................. weather factor
Complacency ........................ mentioned being complacent
Not monitoring autopilot .......... mentioned not monitoring autopilot
No cross-check ..................... mentioned cross-checks not performed
Overfamiliar crew .................. mentioned being lax because of crew familiarity
Call-sign confusion ................ communication confusion owing to similar call
signs
Read-back/hear-back ............... incorrect read-back to ATC not detected by ATC
Misunderstood ...................... ATC clearance not understood
Pilot off radio ....................... one pilot not monitoring ATC frequency
Frequency congestion .............. difficulty communicating with busy ATC
Crew coordination .................. crew not working well together
Altitude alerter misset .............. wrong altitude set in altitude-alerter window
Barometer misset ................... barometric pressure misset in altimeter
Different AC systems .............. confusion owing to different systems in different
aircraft
Autopilot capture killed ............ automatic altitude capture disabled because of
inadvertent action
Inexperience.. .............. lack of experience with autoflight/FMS
Complex autopilot .................. mentioned complexity of autopilot
Complex FMS ...................... mentioned complexity of FMS
Loss of flight skill .................. mentioned loss of basic flight skills
Radio discipline ..................... not using standard phraseology
Computer malfunction ............. autofiight system malfunctioned or did not work
as expected
Long day ............................ mentioned long duty time and/or fatigue as
problem
• , , --, . ...................... ........ - ., _ f?_-_ _ _ ?j. ,. ..........
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Table2.DescriptiveFactorsAssignedtoAltitude-DeviationReports
Assigned factors
Aircraft cockpit type, number
of reported occurrences
Traditional Glass
Distraction
CDU/FMS programming 0 14
Emergency system 3 0
In-flight training 1 2
Lack of knowledge 3 5
High workload 7 10
Complex flight path 1 7
Aircraft system problem 2 5
Weather 5 2
Complacency
Not monitoring autopilot 6 10
No cross-check 8 13
Overfamiliar crew 2 1
ATC Communication
Call-sign confusion 3 1
Read-back, hear-back 21 12
Misunderstood 4 1
Pilot off radio 11 9
Frequency congestion 5 2
Cockpit Communication
Crew coordination 19 14
Altitude alerter misset 0 5
Barometer misset 0 2
Training
Different AC systems 1 3
Autopilot capture killed 1 4
Inexperience 3 15
Complex autopilot 0 5
Complex FMS 0 4
Loss of flight skill 1 3
Radio discipline 4 0
Fatigue
Long day 6 10
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SAMPLE NARRATIVES FROM ASRS REPORTS
The following ten ASRS narratives were chosen to illustrate the range of problems identified in
the initial survey. They provide insight into how the new technology in the glass cockpit airliners
has changed the nature and types of errors in the altitude change task. In the following section,
these incidents will be used to construct a composite descriptive model of information flow and
processing during the altitude change task.
1. Crew Distracted by Programming the Flight Management System
The following report from the first officer of a glass cockpit airliner describes an altitude
deviation that occurred during the descent phase of flight as both pilots attempted to program a
holding pattern into the flight-management system (FMS). 8
Descending from higher flight levels to 15,000ft. on Center clearance had
anticipated and received clearance to hold at BUCKS due to anticipated weather
delay. Captain flying on autopilot using LNA V [lateral navigation] on company
stored route everything routine. Captain is a check airman on this aircraft. I am 5-
year airline pilot, but only 3 months experience on [glass] equipment. Captain
pulled up "hold" page on FMC [flight-management computer] and began to enter
data. We were currently descending on rate of descent command to 15,000ft.
altitude as assigned. I'm reading holding data to captain as he" s entering data via
keypad. Both eyes off of primary flight instruments but in altitude capture mode
(VNA V) [vertical navigation] and LNA V so both pilots are anticipating automatic
level off at 15,000ft. altitude. Captain apparently entered hold at PPOS [present
position] instead of at BUCKS in error, and aircraft begins left turn unexpectedly.
L in confusion, not knowing he entered PPOS by mistake, stated, "This isn't
right," and saw captain disengage autopilot to stop turn while he goes back to FMC
page to find out why the aircraft was turning. I immediately went to the LEGS
page to find out where we should be, got to VOR/ILS [very high-frequency
omnidirectional radio range instrument landing system] mode and picked up en
route chart to tune in present position. Aircraft descended below 15,000ft.. Horn
went off at approximately 14,600ft. Captain called out "Out of l6 for 15." I said
no (looking up) and said we were at 14,500ft., only cleared to 15,000ft., that was
a low altitude alert, not "1,000ft. to go" horn. Immediately pulled back up. No
ATC lair-traffic control] communication took place by either ATC or us about
event. Within 30 seconds, ATC gave us new frequency and cleared us to 13,000
ft. No conflict or discussion or awareness of event was stated by ATC. Below
15,000ft. for about 20 seconds.
Cause is obvious---both pilots' attention diverted from aircraft flight path. I
suggest hold-page (not used often) be made more user friendly. Have captain tell
first officer to watch flight progress while he is correcting other problems. I
personally feel that although the FMC is a great tool, it shouldn't be used all the
time, especially below FL180. It takes too much pilot attention, especially when
newly assigned to the aircraft. Just because the technology exists doesn" t mean it
should be used. Better pilot training on FMC/pilot problem areas like this should
be provided. Also, loss of a flight engineer's eyes is not in the interest of aviation
safety. (ASRS#144196 )
This incident report illustrates several problems that can occur in the altitude-change task. The
crew apparently correctly received the clearance, set the altitude alert, and set up the autopilot to
descend and capture the cleared 'altitude of 15,000 ft. If the crew had done nothing more, the
aircraft was set up to level off automatically at the new altitude. Both pilots were distracted from
8 The narratives have been lightly edited to improve readability. The numbers that appear at the end of the narratives
are ASRS accession numbers.
theirroutinetaskof monitoringthealtitudechangebythenonroutinetaskof programmingthe.
flight managementcomputer(FMC)for theupcomingholdingpattern.Normally,noproblem
wouldhaveresultedfrom notdoingtheusualcheckingandmonitoringtasks.Thepilots might
havebeenout-of-the-loopwith respecto altitude,but theautopilotwouldhaveperformedproperly
andwouldhavesuccessfullycapturedthenewaltitude.Thecaptain'sFMS (flight-management
system)programmingerrorcausedanunexpectedleft turn. Whenthecaptaindisconnectedthe
autopilot,theundesiredturn wasstopped,butdisconnectingtheautopilothadtheunintendedand
apparentlyunexpectedsideeffectof cancellingthealtitudecapture.Bothcrewmembersmusthave
beenfurtherdistractedfrom monitoringaltitudeby attemptingtodiagnosetheunexpectedautopilot
behaviorbecausenomentionis madein thereportof eitherpilot makingthe"thousand-to-go"call
at 16,000ft. or seeingor hearingtheapproachingaltitudealert. Diagnostictasksarenotoriousfor
capturingattentionfrom moreroutinemonitoringtasks.9 Bothpilotsin this incidentseemto have
noticedthelow-altitudealert,but thecaptainapparentlyinterpretedit astheapproaching-altitude
alertandannounced"out of sixteenfor fifteen." Thiserroneouscall is agoodexampleof ahuman
behaviorwith automationphenomenathatWienerhasreferredto as"primary/secondarytask
inversion"(Wiener1985b;1987).Primary/secondarytaskinversiondescribessituationsin which
adisplay,in thiscasetheauralapproaching-altitudealert,isdesignedto backuptheprimarytaskof
monitoringaltitudewith theprimaryaltitudedisplaythealtimeter,butovertimethebackupdisplay
becomesaprimarysourceof informationabouttheaircraft'ssituationwith respecto capturingthe
newaltitude. In this incident,thehumanmonitoringtasksfailedandthealtitudealertermustbe
creditedwith alertingthecrewto thealtitudedeviation.
Oneway thatpeopledetecterrorsinoperatinga machineisby noticingthatthemachinedoes
notrespondin theway thattheyexpectit to respond.If themachinedoesnotrespondto aninput
asexpected,eithertheoperatorhasmadeaninputerror,theoperator'sexpectationof the
machine'sbehaviorto theinputis notcorrect,or themachinehasfailed. Thisnarrativeillustrates
therelativeeffectivenessof twodifferent kindsof unexpectedeventsin alertingthecrewto a
potentialerror.
Thepilotsimmediatelydetectedtheunexpectedleft turn. Theirexpectationswere,mostlikely,
thattheaircraftwouldcontinueon astraightcourseuntil reachingBUCKSandonly thenbegina
left turnto entertheholdingpattern.Sincetheyhadsetup theautopilotto captureandhold 15,000
ft. theyalsohadanexpectationthattheplanewouldcontinuedescendingandthenlevelat 15,000
ft. Unfortunately,disconnectingtheautopilotto stoptheunexpectedleft turnalsohadtheside
effectof disablingtheautomaticaltitudechange,andtheairplanedescendedbelow15,000ft. The
deviationwasnotdetecteduntil thefirst officerheardthelow-altitudealert,l°
In thefirst case,anunexpectedeventoccurred,andthecrew immediatelydetectedtheproblem.
In thesecond,anexpectedeventdid notoccur, andthecrewdid not immediatelydetectthe
problem.This is probablyaresult,in partat least,of havinganeventthatisexpectedto occur,but
notimmediately.Thealtitudelevel-offwasexpectedto happensometimein thefuture. Some
errorscauseunexpectedeventsto occur,andtheyarethemostlikely to berapidlydetected.Other
errorscauseanexpectedeventnot tooccur,andtheyaremuchlesslikely to bedetectedwhenthe
expectedeventthatiscanceledbytheerroris notexpectedto occurimmediately.Thealtitude
alerterprovidesapositiveeventif a level-offat theselectedaltitudedoesnotoccurbut in altitude
alertersthatprovideanauralsignalonlywhenleavingthetargetaltitude,thevisual/auralsignalis
triggeredtoolatetopreventanaltitudedeviation.
Thereporterof this incidentassignedits causeto distractioncausedby programmingtheFMC
atlow altitude. Hesuggestslessprogrammingat low altitudeandmoreexplicit transferof
responsibilityto thePNFfor monitoringflight progressif thePFis distractedby unexpected
problems.Otherpossibilitiesfor avoidingthisparticularerrorareto: (1)delayprogrammingthe
holdingpatternuntil theaircraftis attheholdaltitude;(2) havethePNFdo theprogramming;and
(3) havetheotherpilot checktheprogrammingbefore"executing"thenewprogrammedpath. Of
9ThemostinfamouscaseistheL-1011crashintheEverglades(NTSB1973).
10Thephrase,"killedthecapture,"hasbeenusedtodescribethiskindofaltitudedeviations.
course,a simplerholdpageor moretrainingonproblemsandmalfunctionsfor glasscockpit
autopilotsmightalsohavepreventedthisproblem.
2. Error in Programming Flight-Management System
The following report from the captain of a glass cockpit airliner describes an altitude deviation
that occurred during the descent phase of flight when an error was made in programming the FMS.
The first officer was flying the descent with VNA V and RNA V [area
navigation] selected. Center cleared us to make a heading change to intercept a
radial and cross 30 DME [distance measuring equipment] prior to the VOR at
11,O00ft. I verified that we could make the restriction and observed the first
officer program the computer. The new first officer made several errors in the
fairly lengthy procedure which required a new waypoint, a radial to the waypoint,
crossing restrictions at the waypoint, as well as a turn to intercept the new course.
Time became short, and as I attempted to assist him in correcting his errors, I
inadvertently inserted the wrong waypoint. (I inserted the radial altitude rather than
the radial/DME as the fx.) I then assisted the first officer in accomplishing the
procedure. I did not realize the error until we were leveling at the waypoint, and
approach control asked us if Center had given us the crossing restriction.
This error emphasizes that the complex cockpit can, at times, be a hindrance
rather than an advantage. A constant verification of data and inputs is required. It
would have been much easier to have forgotten the magic of the computer and
reverted to VOR navigation while discussing the proper procedures for computer
programming after we were on the ground. I feel that below lO, O00 ft. during the
approach phase of the flight, the computer can be detrimental to safety. During this
phase, it is essential for one pilot to be looking outside and it is very easy for both
heads to be looking at the computer. The navigation display can still be used and is
extremely useful for map reference, but probably should be reprogrammed as little
as necessary and only when the other pilot is maintaining a vigil for traffic. (ASRS
#141870)
In this incident, the autopilot accurately guided the aircraft over the path that the crew had
programmed into the FMS but the flight path description was in error. They created a fix 11 miles
prior to the VOR rather than 30 miles prior to the VOR. The reporter is probably correct in stating
that it would have been much simpler to abandon the FMS and revert to VOR navigation. Solving
their problem with conventional VOR navigation would have involved simply selecting a new VOR
radial and doing a little mental arithmetic to figure the appropriate descent rate to meet the crossing
restriction. Conventional VOR/DME navigation is characterized by a series of short mental and
physical tasks distributed over time. Navigation with an FMS is characterized by a more lengthy
initial task of entering the planned route, and then less involvement while the route is being flown.
With an FMS, the route has to be completely specified before it can be initiated.
Field studies of cockpit automation (Wiener 1985a; 1989; Curry 1985) have shown that pilots
are often reluctant to turn off the automatics and revert to less automatic flight modes. Curry
(1985) has recommended that pilots be given "turn-it-off' training. However, the proper solution
must await the design of more powerful interfaces to the navigation system or datalink facilities that
send the descriptions of flight path in a form that is readable by the FMS, so that pilots do not have
to perform the cognitively demanding and error-prone task of translating a clearance from the
language of ATC to the language of the FMS.
We will see in other incidents that there is often a mismatch between the pilots' intentions and
the interface that is provided for communicating those intentions to the autopilot and flight
management system. In discussing nonaviation computer interface problems, researchers studying
the problem of human-computer interaction (Norman 1986; Hutchins et al. 1986) have referred to
the problem of translating from a users' mental intentions to physical actions with the computer as
the gulf of execution. This incident also provides evidence for a parallel gulf, the gulf of
evaluation, because the programming error was not evident to the flight crew.
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3. A Missing Minus Sign
Thenextincidentreportby thef'u'stofficerof aglasscockpitaircraftprovidesafurtherexample
of thedifficulty pilotscanhavein translatingtheirintentionsto thelanguageof theFMS, andin
detectingmismatchesbetweenwhattheyintendedandwhattheyactuallyprogrammed.
On an en-route descent into Dayton our clearance was direct RID VOR, direct
DAYTON with a descent to l l,000 ft. The controller gave us a new clearance to
cross 10 miles west of RID at lO,O00 ft. The captain, being less experienced in
using the flight management computer than I, wanted me to show him how to
program the descent for the new restrictions. We put the restrictions in the magic
box, and for some reason, almost certainly something we did improperly, the
machine wanted to make the restriction 10 miles east of RID. By the time we
caught the error in the midst of doing checklists and the usual cockpit duties we
were too late to make the restriction. Nothing was said and there was no conflict.
There was no question that this mistake was our fault, but it brings up a point.
These whiz bang computers and flight management systems are great, but you not
only have to watch them like a hawk, they are an error waiting to spring. Flight
management systems as they are currently designed do the most and are easiest to
use when you need them least---at cruise. The closer you are to the ground, that is
on takeoff or approach, the more demanding of attention they are. Reprogramming
for constantly changing clearances, which happens most in the takeoff or approach
phases, distracts attention from outside and inside vigilance, and sets up situations
where mistakes are likely to occur as the workload increases. To be sure, pilots are
responsible for making whatever restrictions there are, not the computers. If we're
going to have these sophisticated and really wonderful machines in the cockpit,
design effort should be put into making them more useful and less prone to
inducing errors in the takeoff and approach phases. (ASRS #148853)
This and incident No. 2 illustrate an inherent danger in interfaces like the CDU [control display
unit] that use a symbolic language to describe the flight path. In incident No. 2, the inadvertent
substitution of a symbolic description of the altitude (" 11") for a symbolic description of the
distance ("030") of the fix from the VOR resulted in a 19-mile error in the fix location. In this
incident, an error in inputting a single character ("RID/10" versus "RID/- 10") resulted in a 20-mile
error in the location of an altitude-crossing restriction. The power of symbolic systems is that
small descriptions can specify large processes. The danger is that small mistakes in specification
can lead to large errors. The incommensurability of the magnitude of causes and effects in
symbolic systems can create situations that take operators by surprise.
This narrative also illustrates another factor that was observed in several reports: in-flight
training, in which one pilot attempts to instruct the other pilot on the use of automatic equipment,
can distract both pilots from the primary task of maintaining altitude awareness. In-flight training
on the operation of complex systems such as the autoflight and FMSs is going to happen, but it
should be done during the low-workload cruise phase of flight. Unfortunately, as the report of
this incident points out, the clearances that require complex reprogramming usually occur during
the already busy climb and descent phases of flight.
4. The Green Are
The following incident report from the captain of a glass cockpit airliner describes an altitude
deviation in which unexpected behavior of the green altitude arc on the map display helped the
captain detect the problem. The green arc is a symbol on electronic map displays that indicates
where the aircraft will be on the map when it reaches the altitude set in the altitude alerter window if
the aircraft maintains its current rate of descent. It provides the pilots with a tool for monitoring
progress toward the achievement of a crossing restriction without requiring FMS programming.
Approaching Denver over NW arrival gate, l programmed the FMC for a
VNA V destination to cross DRAKO at FL200, 250 KIAS and Denver at l l ,O00 ft.
Approaching DRAKO, Denver approach controller cleared us to cross the Denver
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313 o radial at 10 DME fix at 13,000ft. due to turbulence. I disengaged the
autopilot and hand flew the descent using the green altitude arc over the 10 DME ftx
waypoint inserted by the first officer. This arc is predicated on the altitude selected
in the altitude window of the MCP [mode control panel]. As we progressed, I
noticed I was falling behind the required descent profile. Checking the altitude
window, I saw 11,000ft. I asked first officer if we had been cleared to 11,000ft.,
thus cancelling the 13,000ft. restriction. He replied that the clearance was to cross
the fix at l l ,O00 ft. Apparently when he had inserted the waypoint, he had put in
l l ,O00 ft. instead of 13,000' and later set the MCP altitude window to agree with
it. Anyway, I increased our descent rate only to have approach control point out
our error as we neared l I ,O00 ft. Recleared to l l ,O00 ft., we completed the flight.
Due to the turbulence and the fact that we normally are at 11,000ft. at that point
in the profile, l failed to have the first officer verify our clearance before descending
below 13,000'. We were in the tenth hour of a duty day that began early a.m. and
fatigue may well have been a factor. Further, I have resolved to do less VNAV
techniques in the approach phase. EFIS (eIectronic flight instrument system) is
great stuff, but there is a tendency to try to do too much with it too long. I would
be interested to know if you can detect a trend of increasing incidents concerned
with glass cockpits. (ASRS #144996)
This incident further illustrates the role that expectations can play in detecting errors or, in this
case, almost detecting errors. The captain noticed that the aircraft was "falling behind the required
descent profile." This statement implies an expectation by the captain of how the aircraft should
have been proceeding. The unexpected behavior triggered a check of the altitude set in the altitude-
alerter window. This value, 11,000 ft., was different than the captain expected and he queried the
FO (f'trst officer). Here he almost caught the error that caused this altitude deviation. As he
mentioned later in the report, "I failed to have the first officer verify our clearance before
descending below 13,000 ft.". Another expectation that the captain had that influenced his
decision not to check the clearance with ATC was that "we normally are at 11,000 ft. at that point
in the profile."
Similar to comments made in several other reports in our sample, the reporter mentioned that
fatigue may have been a con_buting factor. A number of the reports concluded with a phrase
similar to "and we were tired. This is important because the redundant checking that enables the
system to be error tolerant is a sort of"luxury" task. If one has the time to do them, they are done,
but when work load is high and the pilots are fatigued, redundant checking tasks are often curtailed
first, when they are needed most.
5. An Unexpected Clearance and a Tired Crew
The following incident reported by the first officer of a glass cockpit aircraft further illustrates
the way expectations and fatigue can affect task performance.
Atlanta tower will clear us to 4,000ft. on departure and give us our first turn
and always immediately hand us off to departure control, who will always clear us
to lO,O00 ft. (usually long before we get to 4,000ft.). What happened: On
departure, Atlanta tower gave us our first turn and that was all. The captain and I
were so conditioned to the continual climb out from Atlanta that we continued
through 4,000 to 4,800ft. before I discovered it and called tower for a hand-off
while the captain stopped the climb and began a descent back to 4,000ft.
This was the second day of a three-day trip and the captain and I had had a short
night before (minimum legal rest). I freely admit that often l feeI exhausted after
and during my trips. This condition often accounts for mistakes and oversights not
related to the safety of the flight. However, I've got to consider the possibility that
the chances go up for making such a mistake that does affect the safety of the flight
in that condition. Consider the minimum 8-hour rest. Off duty at 10:00 P.M.
Hotel van shows up at 10:15 P.M., arrive at the hotel at 10:30 P.M., in bed by
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11:00 P.M., wake up call at 04:45 A.M., leave hotel 05:45 A.M., airport at 6:00
A.M. Net 5 3/4 hours sleep. Get real guys. t The FARs allow this but nobody
seems to acknowledge that it's unreasonable. Not the Feds, not the company, and
even many pilots have just given up complaining. Why? (ASRS #154424)
Here the crew flew the departure that they expected to fly, not the actual clearance. In the
human error literature, this is called a capture error (Norman 1981; Reason and Mycielska 1982;
Reason 1990). A common example is intending to run an errand on the way home from work and
finding yourself at home with the errand not done. This phenomenon is more prevalent when
complicated by crew fatigue.
This incident is another example of the difficulty in detecting the absence of an expected
event--in this case the absent hand-off and clearance to 10,000 ft.
6. One-Pilot-off-Radio Incident
This incident was reported by the first officer of a conventional-technology aircraft. It
illustrates a common breakdown in the error-tolerant properties of the cockpit system in both the
conventional and glass cockpits. One of the pilots was off the ATC radio frequency, talking to his
airline operations or getting the ATIS (automated terminal information system) airport information,
and did not detect a clearance communication error by the other pilot. The reporter suggests that
this class of incident might be reduced when datalink is utilized and pilots can receive ATIS
information and company communications without leaving the traffic-control frequency.
While on a flight from EWR to SYR, we began our approach into the SYR
area. I was first officer and the captain was flying the aircraft. I left Center
frequency in order to listen to the ATIS and talk to company operations. When I
returned to Center frequency, the captain informed me that we had been cleared to
cross 35 n. mi. east of SYR at lO,O00 ft. After descending to 10,000, we were
instructed to contact SYR approach. The approach controller was very surprised
that we were at lO, O00 ft. He told us that the normal procedure was.., to clear
inbound aircraft down to l l ,O00 ft. and then instruct them to contact SYR. This
information of course caused us to question whether or not the captain had correctly
understood the clearance. The SYR controller advised us that no conflict had
resulted.
This is yet another case of a possible clearance deviation while one flight crew
member is not monitoring the ATC frequency. All ATC communications should be
monitored and verified by each pilot whenever possible. This is especially
important in the case of altitude assignments and crossing restrictions. Situations
such as this could easily be avoided in ACARS-equipped aircraft by using ACARS
[ARINC Communications and Reporting System] to obtain ATIS, gate, and other
information. The technology required to do this has existed for years.
Unfortunately, it will probably take a major accident before the airlines begin to
fully utilize this equipment. (ASRS #147683)
As we will discuss in the next section on the properties of error-tolerant systems, when neither
pilot is monitoring the ATC frequency many potential opportunities for detecting and correcting
communication errors are lost.
7. Lack of an Aural Approaching-Altitude Alert Blamed
In earlier reports on altitude deviations (Factors... 1977; Human... 1978), several pilots
complained about the aural warn that sounded to alert them that the aircraft was approaching the
altitude set in the altitude-alerter window. Pilots complained that this chime went off so often that
they became habituated to it and often did not hear it. It was also argued that because of the
presence of this aural reminder, pilots often did not monitor altitude and relied solely on the aural
alert for awareness of the approaching level-off. Wiener (1985b; 1987) described this change as
an example of primary/secondary task inversion. Because of these arguments, the aural part of the
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altitudealertwasmadeoptionalandisonly afeaturein someglasscockpitairliners.11Our sample
of reportscontainedseveralcaseslike thatnotedbelowin whichthereporterclaimedthatif there
hadbeenanauralalert,thereportedaltitudedeviationwouldnothaveoccurred.
While on vectors for an ILS runway 13L at JFK, we were instructed to descend
and maintain 3,000ft. We vacated 7,000ft. and began in-range checklist. Aircraft
was being flown on autopilot (autopilot is equipped with altitude capture). As I
was completing the approach briefing, approach calmly advised us to climb and
maintain 3,000ft. (No sense of urgency in his voice). We had allowed the aircraft
to descend to 2,200ft. I immediately disconnected autopilot and climbed back to
3,000ft. (The autopilot indicated an altitude capture, but it continued to descend.)
The flight continued without further occurrence.
The controller never mentioned anything more about the altitude excursion. I
don't think that our altitude excursion resulted in any traffic conflicts. This
occurrence could have easily been avoided by monitoring the aircraft's progress
throughout the descent. In my experience in this aircraft type, I had never
witnessed it not capture an altitude. This good reliability of the autopiIot may have
left some complacency within me. The aircraft isn't equipped with an aural altitude
alert, but rather with a dimly lit light. This occurrence wouldn't be a problem in the
future with proper altitude awareness and constant monitoring of the aircraft. I
believe that we wouldn't have busted our altitude by 800ft. if our aircraft was
equipped with an aural warning. (ASRS #147164)
Always having or never having an aural alert are not the only options available for the altitude-
alert system. Lyddane (1991) has argued that the aural altitude alert should only sound if the
altitude-alerter system detects that an immediate level-off is required to capture the altitude set in the
altitude window. Pilots should not habituate to this alert because it should only sound in the rare
situations when an altitude deviation is about to occur. It also should alert the pilot so that action
can be taken in time to prevent the altitude deviation.
This report is an example of crew complacency with the automatic system. As the reporter
mentions, both pilots were running a checklist and conducting the approach briefing and not
performing the normal checking of aircraft altitude. The reporter states that "This occurrence could
have easily been avoided by monitoring the aircraft's progress throughout the descent."
Complacency and distraction by. apparently more important primary tasks appear to be the main
reasons why redundant monitonng and checking tasks are not accomplished., yet it is the
monitoring and checking tasks that give the system its error-tolerant propemes.
8. High Performance Low Altitude Level Off
The new-technology aircraft differ from older aircraft in several ways other than the level of
automation in the cockpit. The goal of having good single-engine performance when one engine is
shut down and the aircraft is heavily loaded has resulted in remarkable climb performance in a
lightly loaded aircraft with both engines operating normally. The following incident illustrates how
lack of pilot familiarity with this high-performance aircraft and a low-altitude level-off can result in
a speed and altitude deviation.
Taking off from ORD in a [large transport] with a light load and maximum take-
off power (engine anti-ice on). The first officer, just out of training, was.flying the
leg while I handled communications. Each of us had only done one previous leg in
a [large transport]. (I have several hundred hours in [wide body transport].) The
combination of cold weather, maximum power, and a nearly empty aircraft caused
the airspeed to increase extremely rapidly after liftoff. The first officer was
reluctant to raise the nose to the extreme angle required to maintain 250 (in this
case, probably better than 25 o). When I saw the airspeed zipping though 270, I
11 See FAR Paragraph 91.219.
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warned him to slow down and he disconnected the autothrottles, manually retarding
power and raising the nose just as the flight director went to altitude capture
(between 3500 and 4,000ft.). Attempting to level at 5,000ft., we overshot by
200-300ft. (still fast), when we were cleared to 14,000 fL (I don't really know
whether we actually broke 5,300ft. before being cleared up.) I punched flight-
level change, but the autothrottles refused to engage initially. In the confusion over
exactly what was wrong, we both were slow to respond to several heading
changes, which understandably annoyed the controller.
Nothing really serious here, except the same old story. Both of us were
engrossed in trying to figure out why this computerized marvel was doing what it
was, rather than turning everything off and manually flying (which we finally did)
until we could sort things out. This is a common tendency in this type of cockpit,
but our unfamiliarity with the super high performance of the LGT [large transport]
was a contributing factor. It really is a handful to takeoff and level at a low altitude
and seems to require an almost immediate power reduction to maintain a reasonable
nose attitude at low weights. (ASRS #134179)
In addition to the problems caused by the crew's lack of familiarity with the high performance
of their twin-engine aircraft., this incident illustrated two other problems. First, like the crew
attempting to set up the hold at waypoint BUCKS 9incident No. 1), this crew mentions being
distracted by attempting to determine why the autoflight system was not performing as they
expected. Second, as reported in prior examples, this crew appears to have difficulty translating
the departure clearance from ATC language to the language of the autoflight and FMS. In this
incident, the pilots would probably have liked to have been able to instruct the autoflight system to
adjust the power after takeoff so that the air speed would not exceed 250 knots and the pitch angle
would not exceed some upper limit. It is not possible to enter a combination of an altitude target
and pitch-attitude constraints with the autopilot MCP or FMS in today's cockpits. In these
situations, pilots could probably more easily achieve their objectives by performing a reduced-
thrust takeoff or by not using the autothrottles at all and controlling power manually instead.
9. Ambiguous Shorthand and a Misset Altimeter
The following incident illustrates a classic cause of an altitude deviation that is possible on both
conventional- and glass cockpit aircraft. Aircraft altimeters depend on barometric pressure to
measure altitude. If the reference barometric reading is not entered correctly, the altimeters will
display the wrong altitude and, unless detected by the pilots, the aircraft will level at what appears
in the cockpit to be the correct altitude but is not, because the altimeter's barometric reference has
been set incorrectly.
On descent, captain misread ATIS altimeter setting (placed wind in barometer
window as opposed to altimeter setting); i.e., 3009 instead of 2957. Autopilot
leveled aircraft at lO,O00 ft., but aircraft was actually at approximately 9,450'.
Controller asked our altitude and gave the current altimeter setting, at which time the
captain reset his altimeter and the aircraft returned to proper altitude.
I have noticed on several occasions (in a two-man crew) that in busy
environments such as ORD, cross checks on altimeters and other items are not
performed as quickly as they should be. There were two approaches in use, but none
had been specified for use for us, so both needed to be studied, along with steering
for vectors, and complying with ATC instructions and performing other cockpit
duties. I had written the ATIS information on our company changeover information
paper and presented it in the normal fashion: 80 3H 3009 29.57 ILS 27R ILS 27L. 12
We were both busy, as is normal at this phase of flight---especially on a 2-man crew,
12 This 32-character string--"80 3H 3009 29.57 ILS 27R ILS 27L"---decodes to the following: The ceiling is
8,000 ft, visibility is 3 miles in haze, wind direction is 300 °, wind speed is 9 knots, barometric pressure is
29.57, expect an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to either runway 27L or 27R.
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and captain misread and misset the altimeter and l failed to cross check it in a timely
fashion to prevent an altitude deviation. (ASRS #133242)
Cryptic abbreviations of aviation information combined with wind descriptions that make
plausible barometric settings encourage this kind of error. This is another example in which a
small error in processing symbolic information can lead to a large error in the altitude of the
aircraft--in this case an error of 550 ft.
Again, the introduction of datalink facilities that allow pilots to receive ATIS information when
time permits shOuld reduce errors of this kind. Of course, datalink technology will do little for this
problem as long as the format of the presentation of weather data continues to incorporate these
abbreviations. For example, many glass cockpit airplanes currently receive destination weather
reports via datalink. Here is an actual example of a destination weather report received via ACARS
on a recent flight to San Francisco:
SFO 1450 CLR 8 193/
46/4 1/2303/0 1 0/FEW
SC CI E /FH ALQDS/
103 1501 / SOSF 50/
1206
Looks like a nice day, doesn't it? The technology exists to translate this into a format that
would be much easier to read. This also contains information that is of interest to meteorologists,
but not to pilots. For example, the "193" in the flu'st line means that the sea level barometric
pressure is 1019.3 millibars, information that is of no use to pilots. The barometer setting they
need for their altimeters is in the second line, "010", meaning the local barometer setting is 30.10
in. Hq. Many pilots have no idea what those first digits encode, and there is no reason they need
to know.
10. Misplaced Trust in the Autoflight System
In the following narrative, the pilot provides a good summary of how the lack of checking and
cross-checking tasks during flight with the autoflight system engaged can lead to an altitude
deviation.
Another altitude bust in the "Brand X" aircraft. I've never in my career had so
many altitude busts until I got in this airplane. The scenario is all too familiar. One
pilot involved in approach miscellany (ATIS, checklists, etc.) the other pilot
trusting the autopilot to make the level off and getting involved in something else at
the last minute. Next is the sound of the altitude warning and a mad scramble to
level the aircraft off before ATC notices. This time we made it down to 500ft. too
low due to a high rate of descent engendered by a crossing restriction given too
close in by ATC. My fault for assuming the first officer had it under control. His
fault for assuming the autopilot had it. The designers flight managers/flight
instructors fault for encouraging maximum utilization for the autopilot which has
the net effect of taking the pilot out of the loop in spite of your best intentions.
Human beings are not good "monitors" of machinery; the mind tends to wander if
there is no need to actively control the process. (ASRS #144385).
This report highlights the fact that once the automatic systems are programmed, supervisory
control tasks remain for the pilots.
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FIELD STUDY FINDINGS
The altitude-deviation incidents described in our sample and the pilot/reporters statements
concerning the probable causes of those incidents are in general agreement with the findings of an
extensive field study of pilots of a glass cockpit airliner performed by Wiener (1989). He reported
that "Many pilots, while reporting that they enjoyed flying a modern plane, also indicated strong
reservations in two critical areas: (1) safety, and (2) workload reduction. As for safety, many of
the crews expressed the view that automation 13 may have gone too far, that they felt they were
often 'out of the loop,' probably meaning that they tended to lose situation awareness, and that
they feared that automation led to complacency." With respect to workload, there was strong
disagreement, but at least half the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased
workload, that workload was increased during phases of flight already characterized by high
workload, and decreased during periods of low workload. Many crews reported that in times of
heavy workload, they tended to "click it off," that is to revert to manual modes of flight guidance,
because they did not have time to do the programming necessary to exploit the automation. Wiener
refers to this last finding as the "paradox-of-automation;" i.e., when the workload ishighest, it is
often not used. Wiener attributes this problem both to the difficult-to-use interface with the FMS
and to the many ATC clearance changes that are common in busy terminal areas.
BUILDING A SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The altitude-change task consists of several components. Some of these can be specified a
priori from knowledge of the task. Figures 2 and 3 were constructed in this way. Other elements
may be specified in the various documents that are involved in training pilots, regulating their
actions, or promoting a "pilot culture." For example, the Airman's Information Manual (AIM)
specifies pilot responsibilities upon issuance of a clearance as follows:
a. RECORD ATC CLEARANCE: When conducting an IFR operation, make a written
record of your clearance ....
b. ATC CLEARANCE/INSTRUCTION READBACK: Pilots of airborne aircraft should
read back those parts of ATC clearances and instructions containing altitude assignments
or vectors as a means of mutual verification. The read-back of the "numbers" serves as
a double check between pilots and controllers and reduces the kinds of communications
errors that occur when a number is either "misheard" or is incorrect ....
c. It is the responsibility of the pilot to accept or refuse the clearance issued. (AIM ¶265).
According to the AIM, upon receiving a clearance, the crew should record the clearance, decide
whether the airplane can comply with the clearance, and then either read it back if it is accepted or
notify ATC that the clearance cannot be accepted. That is a normative view of clearance handling.
Observations of actual line operations and full-mission simulation studies show that some elements
are sometimes omitted. Clearances are usually written down when they are complex, for example
when they involve a hold, or a revised departure procedure. Clearances that consist of simple
altitude or heading change instructions are usually not written down. Thus, the actions that are
actually performed by any particular crew in any particular circumstance will usually be a subset of
a larger set of possible actions. In order to understand the properties of the information processing
system that responds to the ATC clearance, we would like to know the full range of possible crew
actions.
Each of the 10 ASRS narratives presented above refers to some of the component of the
altitude-change task and leaves others unspecified. At least one of the narratives refers to each of
the different elements given by the AIM, although no single narrative refers to all three. Those
elements that are unspecified may have been omitted because they did not occur or because the
reporter simply did not find them essential to the point being made. By aggregating across the
13 The term Automation in Wiener's report (as in ours) refers to the flight guidance automation, the autopilot,
autothrottle, and the FMS, not the aircraft systems or the warning system automation.
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reportsor superimposing the elements of each on a common framework, we can create a more
complete description of the task. This will not be a description of any particular performance of the
task, but will be a superset of the actions that actually occur during any particular altitude change.
It will be a general framework that shows the possible components of a task.
Terms of the Task Analysis
Information relevant to the altitude-change task is represented in several different ways, and we
can track it's movement through the cockpit system. A clearance to a new altitude enters the
cockpit as a sequence of spoken words that are heard by the PNF and read back, often slightly
transformed, to the controller. The specification of the altitude is then transformed by the PNF into
a setting on the altitude alerter. Notice that the altitude specification is in some sense the "same"
information whether it is represented in spoken words, as a string of written characters, or in the
digits visible in the display window of the altitude alerter. Speech and writing and the display
window are three different media in which task-relevant information may be represented. A
medium is said to represent some particular piece of information by virtue of having a particular
physical state. For example, the altitu, de-alerter display window represents the altitude thirty three
thousand feet when the digits "33000 appear in order in the window. The crew moves
information through the cockpit system by translating the representation of information in one
medium to a representation in another. We will characterize the information processing of the
cockpit system as a whole in terms of the movement of task-relevant information by agents from
one medium to another. Each medium represents information in a unique way.
Each medium in which information is represented has properties that determine how long the
information expressed in that medium lasts, and how accessible it may be to the members of the
crew. Speech, for example, is usually highly accessible, but it does not endure in time, so
information that is expressed in that medium must be attended to at the time it appears. Notes
written by a pilot on a side window clipboard are less accessible to that pilot than speech is, and
may be completely inaccessible to the other pilot. However, written records endure in time, so that
information that is expressed in that medium lasts and may be referred to many times. These may
seem to be trivial observations, but the cockpit information processing system is made up of these
media, and little facts like these determine the information processing properties and error-tolerant
properties of the system as a whole.
A System of Representations
The set of representations involved in flight path management is quite complex. Much of it,
however, is directly available to an observer in the cockpit, and each of the ASRS narratives
quoted earlier refers to aspects of it. In the following subsection, we develop a framework for the
altitude-change task that includes the elements of the task mentioned in the narratives. This
composite picture will not be a description of any particular altitude change event. It will be instead
a description of the possible paths that task-relevant information can take in the cockpit system.
Each path of information through the cockpit is made up of a number of steps in which the
information is moved from one medium to another. Most of the transformanons of information are
accomplished by members of the crew. We will try to show that the error-tolerant properties of the
system as a whole depend on the organization of these possible trajectories, as well as on the
cognitive properties of the individual crew members. In particular, we will show that errors are
often detected as mismatches between representations that are expected to be congruenL 14
14 Representations may be congruent without being identical as long as they have the same interpretation. That is,
at the level of meaning, the clearance "slow to one nine zero knots" and the read back, "pulling it back to one
ninety" are congruent, although at the level of expectations in auditory memory they are discrepant.
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Theory of Action
The widespread use of personal computers for many tasks has resulted in renewed interest in
how people interact with computers and how they should interact with them. In an attempt to
develop a better understanding of how people use computers to accomplish tasks, Norman and his
colleagues, (Norman 1986; Hutchins et al. 1986) have developed a theory of action that attempts
to specify the mental activities a user must execute to perform a task with a computer. It is one of
the few descriptive models of human behavior that recognizes the importance of evaluative
feedback tasks. 15 Their model is concerned with how a person bridges the gap between task goals
expressed in psychological terms and the machine's mechanisms and states that are expressed in
physical terms. They refer to the discrepancies between the psychological goals and the physical
variables as two gulfs that must be bridged by the system: the gulf of execution and the gulf of
evaluation.
Figure 4 shows the seven stages of user activity that are involved in performing and evaluating
a simple task on a personal computer. To see what this means in the context of the altitude-change
task, consider setting the altitude alerter. The first stage is to establish the goal. For this task, that
would be something like deciding to set the alerter display to the cleared altitude. The next three
stages, forming the intention, specifying the action sequence, and executing the action, are required
to translate from the person's goal expressed in psychological terms to a sequence of inputs that the
machine understands--the machine's input language. The pilot intends to produce a particular
reading in the display. The action specification in this case would involve grasping and rotating the
setting knob of the altitude alerter. Prior knowledge that clockwise rotation produces larger values
might be involved in the formation of the action specification, or it might be rediscovered in action
by turning the knob and monitoring the result. The action specification is then executed as action
in the world. This produces a new physical state in the device.
Gulf of Execution _1
Action L-I" Execution I
Specificati°n] !__ I
EXPECTATIONS PhySeiCal I
EvaluationS_ I Interpretation H
Forming the[
Intention /
I_ Gulf of Evaluation ,_]
Figure 4. Theory of action.
15 An exception to this statement is the many models developed in the field of manual control theory (Baron et al.
1990).
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Thesethreecognitivetasks--intention,specification,andexecution---constitutethegulf of
execution.Thecognitiveprocessesinvolvedin performingtheseelementsbridgethegulf of
execution.Thekindsof processesandtheamountof cognitiveresourcesrequiredto bridgethe
gulf of executionmaydependbothon thetaskdemandsof theenvironmentandtheknowledgeof
theoperator.Thegulf couldbenarrowedeitherbychangingwhattheoperatorknowsor by
changingthedesignof thedeviceswith whichthetaskis performed.
Onceanewstatehasbeenproduced,onemustdeterminewhetherit is thedesiredphysical
state.Is thenumberin thealtitudedisplayarepresentationof theclearedaltitude?To determine
this,thestatemustbeperceived,theperceptioninterpretedasanumber,andtheresulting
representationmustbecomparedwith theintendedstate.Thesefeedbackelementsconstitutethe
gulf of evaluation,andtheprocessesinvolvedin performingtheseelementsbridgethegulf of
evaluation.In thecaseof settingthealtitudealert,bridgingthegulf of evaluationisrelatively
simple. If thegoalwasto produceaparticularkind of flight pathwith crossingrestrictionsby
programmingtheFMS,theexecutionandevaluationprocesswouldhavebeenmuchmore
complex.In thatcase,thehigh-levelgoalof causingtheairplanetoperformaparticularkind of
climb wouldsubsumeothergoals,eachof whichmightspawnacycleof actionandevaluation.
Again,thegulf of evaluationcanbenarrowedeitherby changingwhatthetaskperformerknows
or by changingthedesignof thedeviceswith whichthetaskisperformed.Thedesignof the
human-machineinterfaceplaysanimportantrolein determininghowmuchcognitivework theuser
mustdo in bridgingthegulfsof executionandevaluation.
Actingmayinvolveboththeproductionof actionandanevaluationof theextentto whichthe
achievedoutcomesatisfiestheactor'sintentions.Mismatchesbetweenintentionsandoutcomesare
evidenceof errorandthefeedbackinherentin thetheoryof actionprovidesopportunitiesfor
operatordetectionof errors.
Chronology of Altitude-Change Task Elements
There are at least seven distinguishable elements of the altitude-change task:
1. Hear and record the clearance. Heating the clearance was not mentioned in the AIM
description, but it is an obvious precursor of the other elements. Typically, if a
clearance is to be recorded, it will be written down as the clearance is spoken. We have
seen that this is optional for simple clearances. When a clearance is written down, it
may be recorded before any effort is made to understand what it implies for the airplane.
2. Understand the clearance and decide whether the airplane can comply. Once the
Clearance is heard and understood, the crew must decide whether they will accept it.
3. Read back the clearance or notify ATC that the clearance cannot be accepted. If the
clearance is accepted, then the crew must form a high-level goal to comply with the
clearance. This goal is realized through the satisfaction of a number of sub-goals. In
glass cockpit autoflight operations, the following sub-goals must be satisfied.
4. Create a machine-readable description of the flight path implied by the clearance.
Entering the altitude in the altitude alerter is usually part of this task but not always
all of it.
5. Select a mode of operation for the autoflight computers that uses the appropriate parts of
the flight path description.
6. Couple the autoflight computer outputs to the flight controls.
7. Monitor the performance of the autoflight system and intervene if necessary.
The cognitive activities involved in the accomplishment of each of these subgoals represent a
loop around the seven stages of action. In addition, the satisfaction of the higher-level goal of
complying with the clearance must be evaluated. We may therefore also consider all the actions
described above as elements of the performance of the task of causing the airplane to comply with
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theclearance,andwemayconsiderthemonitoringactivitythatfollowstheseactivities(sometimes
for manyminutes)astheevaluationof theadequacyof theactionsperformed.
If therewereonly onewayto describetheflight path,thealtitude-changetaskwouldprobably
bearelativelysimpleone. However,themodernflight deckcontainsseveralformsof description
of desiredaircraftbehavior.Sincethelanguagein whichflight pathisdescribedto themachinery
isquitedifferentfrom thelanguagein whichtheclearancesare communicated between pilots and
controllers, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the description passed to the autoflight
systems will produce the results described by the clearance. The two most apparent classes of
machine-readable descriptions of flight path are those entered in the MCP 16 and those entered in
the FMS. The MCP actually provides for the creation of partial descriptions of flight path and for
the selection of the mode of operation that links parts of the descriptions to the autopilot.
Let us now consider in some detail the cognitive processes involved in the performance of each
element of the altitude-change task.
Hear and Record the Clearance
Each report narrative (except No. 8) begins with a reference to a spoken clearance. The
clearance is a specification of some aspect of the flight path of the aircraft. The initial step in the
trajectory of the clearance through the cockpit system is from the medium of speech to the medium
of the pilots' mental representations of the meaning of the clearance. Pilots form at least two kinds
of internal representations of the clearance: auditory and semantic. The auditory representation is
simply a representation of the sounds of the spoken words. The semantic representation is a
representation of what the clearance means in terms of the flight path of the airplane. Pilots may
have expectations with respect to either sort of representation and expectations provide the
opportunity for checking the accuracy of the representations (see Fig. 5).
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Figure 5. Information flow and checks in checking the clearance.
16 "Mode control panel" is Boeing terminology; Douglas Aircraft Company calls the same device the flight guidance
control panel and Airbus calls it the flight control unit.
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Perceptionis drivenin partby expectations.Expectationspermitcrewsto "hear"and
reconstructspokenclearanceinformationthatis degradedby noise. Unfortunately,oftento a large
extentwesee(or hear)whatweexpectto see(orhear).Expectationspermitpilots toreconstruct
thewronginformationwhenexpectationsdonotmatchtheclearancethatwassent,or mayresultin
pilots nothearingthatwhich is notexpected(HutchinsandKlausen1992).
Pilotsalsosometimeswrite theclearanceonapieceof paper.IncidentNo. 1seemsto involve
thisrepresentation,sincetheFOmakesreferenceto readingtheclearanceinformationto the
captain.Creatingthewrittenrepresentationfrom thespokenrepresentationinvolvesanother
translationfrom onemediumto anotherandfrom onesetof representationsto another.This
translationisrelativelyautomaticfor thoseliteratein thelanguage.Becauseof frequency
congestion,clearancesareoftenspokenveryrapidly,andashorthandisrequiredto recordthemin
real time. Incident No. 9 demonstrates some of the problems with abbreviated written
representations The four-digit string "3009" is a reasonable representation of either barometric
A • * ° -- • * " " O
pressure in inches of mercury (30.09 in. Hq.) or of wind direcuon and speed (300 and 9 knots).
This ambiguity led to a misinterpretation and an altitude deviation.
Understand the Clearance and Decide on Acceptance
The meaning of the clearance is processed by the crew with respect to an existing model of the
aircraft situation and possibly to a memory of clearances previously received in similar
circumstances. These situation models may entail complex expectations about the clearance to be
received at may point in flight. This is stated most clearly in narrative No. 5:
Atlanta tower will clear us to 4,000ft. on departure and give us our first turn
and always immediately hand us off to departure control, who will always clear us
to lO,O00 ft. (usually long before we get to 4,000ft.).
The good news is that expectations of this sort may permit pilots to detect errors made by
controllers. A mismatch between the meaning of the clearance received and pilot expectations may
direct the pilots' attention to the clearance. The bad news is that action as well as perception may
be expectation driven, and if expectations about flight path do not match the cleared flight path, a
crew may do the wrong thing. The very strong expectation cited above apparently led the crew to
begin to fly their normal departure procedure in the absence of a clearance to climb above 4,000 ft.
The expectations can also be complex and go beyond anticipating particular clearance
information at particular times. Narrative No. 1 shows that the pilot had a model of the situation,
not only of his own airplane, but of the surrounding airspace, of the problems faced by ATC, and
of the sort of solution ATC would seek to a weather-induced problem:
Descending from higher flight levels to 15,000ft. on Center clearance had
anticipated and received clearance to hold at BUCKS due to anticipated weather delay.
Upon hearing the clearance, the .pilots should determine whether the airplane is able to comply
with the clearance. Such determinauon interacts with the current situation assessment of the crew
and with the performance limitations of the airplane, especially with respect to altitude changes.
Can the airplane climb or descend quickly enough to make a specified crossing restriction? Will it
have an adequate buffet margin at the assigned altitude at current gross weight? Will this altitude
and heading provide adequate terrain clearance? Answering these questions may require the pilots
to make use of other information in the cockpit. The pilots' understanding of the aircraft situation
against which the ability to comply with the clearance is tested may not be entirely internally
represented, but may be constructed in interaction with a chart or approach plate, or other depiction
of the physical space around the airplane.
The ease with which these questions can be answered will depend, at least in part, on the way
the relevant information is represented. If the crew has a moving-map display, the consequences
of changes in lateral guidance may be relatively easy to evaluate. In current technology, questions
about changes in vertical guidance are more difficult to answer because there is no graphic display
of the vertical flight plan. We will return to this issue in the discussion of recommendations. The
degree to which crews actually evaluate the consequences of complying with clearances seems to
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behighlyvariable.Althoughthisassessmentshouldbepartof everyclearancehandlingevent,it is
explicitlymentionedonly in narrativeNo. 2:"I verifiedthatwecouldmaketherestriction.... ".
Sincetheclearancemaybeheardbybothpilots,all theprocessesinvolvedin checkingthe
clearancemaytakeplacetwice,oncein eachpilot. Thispotentialfor redundantprocessingby the
twopilotsis oneof themostimportantpropertiesof thecockpitinformationprocessingsystem.At
leastthreeopportunitiesfor thedetectionof errorthroughthecomparisonof representationsexist
within eachpilot.
Read Back the Clearance
If the clearance was written down, the read-back usually consists of literally reading the written
record. If the clearance was not written down, the read-back must proceed from memory. This can
be difficult if the clearance included several elements such as an altitude, a heading, and a frequency
to use in contacting the next ATC facility. There are many opportunities for error in this procedure,
because altitudes, headings, ATC frequencies, and aircraft call signs all consist of strings of
numbers. If it is decided that the airplane can comply with the clearance, the portions of the clearance
specifying altitudes or headings should be read back to the controller. The read-back provides an
opportunity for redundant checking on the clearance as heard by the pilots. It gives the controller a0
opportunity to compare what was told to the pilots with what the pilots read back (see Fig. 6). Two
of the reports refer to possible failures of the read-back to detect an error. In narrative No. 4, the
captain reports that when the airplane performance indicated a steeper than expected descent:
I askedfirst officer if we had been cleared to 11,000 ft., thus cancelling the 13,000ft.
restriction. He replied that the clearance was to cross the fix at l l,O00 ft.
In this case, the captain is using the first officer's memory as a check on his own memory for the
clearance received. This crew might also have asked ATC to conf'mn the clearance, but
unfortunately, they did not.
.... .......... .... J Clearance I
[ O,ear,nco O'oaraooe "oad ok I
I ATC:Working Memory I1 Radio I / IPNF:Working Memory I
_ : Re_cb_ck
I Readback _ Readback PNF: Auditory Memory I
I ATC: Working Memory Radio k_
Figure 6. Information flow and checks involved with the read-back check.
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Theredundantcheckingthatis providedbybothcrewmembersusuallymonitoringATC
communicationsmaybreakdownwhenoneof themleavesthefrequencyto attendtootherwork.
Threeof theincidentreportsrefer to this lossof redundantcross-checking.In narrativeNo. 6, one
of thecrewwasoff-frequencygettingATIS whenaclearancewasreceived:
When I returned to center frequency, the captain informed me that we had been
cleared to cross 35 n. mi. east of SYR at lO,O00 ft. After descending to 10,000, we
were instructed to contact SYR approach. The approach controller was very
surprised that we were at lO,O00 ft. He told us that the normal procedure was...to
clear inbound aircraft down to 11,000ft. and then instruct them to contact SYR.
This information, of course, caused us to question whether the captain had correctly
understood the clearance .... This is yet another case of a possible clearance
deviation while one flight crew member is not monitoring the ATC frequency. All
ATC communications should be monitored and verified by each pilot whenever
possible.
The read-back also permits checking within the cockpit itself, because as one pilot reads the
clearance back, the other pilot, who usually has also heard the clearance, may be able to detect an
error in the read-back. If both crew members are on frequency when clearances are received, there
is also a possibility of redundant checking of the read-back by the other member of the aircrew
(Hutchins and Klausen 1991).
So far, we have seen that the media in which information about the flight path are represented
include speech (the clearance, the read-back), the mental representations of aircraft situation in the
minds of the two pilots, and the charts and other graphical depiction of the flight environment.
Notice that the different media support descriptions of flight path in different languages. That is,
the clearance is in spoken aviationese, whereas the pilots' mental representations may be in some
form of spatial imagery, and the charts are in a graphical language. Furthermore, the internal
representations may be influenced by a history of interaction with particular types of external
representations. This is why chart depictions that are actually quite arbitrary seem natural to
experienced navigators. Evaluating a flight path clearance requtres a translation from one language
of description to another.
Create Machine-Readable Description of Flight Path
Once the clearance has been received and at least minimally processed, we may ask what
becomes of it in the cockpit system. Usually the next stop on the information trajectory is the
altitude preselect window of the altitude alerter. This is the first step in creating a machine-readable
description of flight path in the altitude-change task. Since altitude alerters are required by law in
all civil turbojet aircraft., this portion of creating a machine-readable description is performed in
traditional cockpits as well as in glass cockpits. Simply setting the altitude in the window of the
altitude alerter provides another opportunity for redundant checking. Figure 7 shows the possible
pathways of information in this simple operation. The checking that can be done by the PNF while
setting the altitude alert is part of the task of doing the setting. That is, this is a closed-loop action
in which the PNF adjusts the displayed value until no discrepancy remains between the selected
altitude and the PNF's memory of the cleared altitude. Since the altitude alerter is located where it
can be seen by both pilots, it is also possible for the PF to notice a discrepancy between the
displayed value and the remembered value.
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Figure 7. Information flow and checks during setting of altitude alert.
The representation of altitude in the altitude alerter often becomes the primary memory for the
target altitude in the system. Pilots frequently seem to give this representation precedence over
their own internal memories. Halverson (U. of California, San Diego, California; manuscript in
work) reports an incident in which a pilot leveled off at the altitude shown in the altitude-alerter
window even though he heard and correctly read back a clearance to a different altitude only
moments earlier. In narrative No. 4, in a rather subtle example, a captain failed to question an
erroneous setting of the altitude window. It seemed odd to him because it did not agree with what
he thought he had heard and because the airplane's performance seemed unusual:
As we progressed, I noticed I was falling behind the required descent profile.
Checking the altitude window, I saw l l,O00 ft. I asked first officer if we had been
cleared to I I,000 ft., thus cancelling the 13,000ft. restriction. He replied that the
clearance was to cross the fix at 11,000ft.
Yet the captain did not question it because the 11,000 ft. altitude met his long-term expectations
about the usual altitude of the airplane at this point in the flight:
Due to the turbulence and the fact that we normally are at 11,000ft. at that point
in the profile, I failed to have the first officer verify our clearance before descending
below 13,000ft.
This led to an altitude bust.
Recall that one of the functions of the read-back is to permit the controller to be certain that the
pilots intend to do what the controller has asked them to do. Even if the pilots have read back the
clearance correctly, there is no guarantee that they have understood it correctly, or that they have
taken the appropriate actions with respect to it. In particular, it is possible to hear and read-back a
clearance and then either forget to reset or misset the altitude in the altitude alerter. This has been
observed in our sample of reports and in a full-mission simulation (Halverson, C., U. of
California, San Diego, California; manuscript in work). One possible technological solution for
25
thissituationwouldbeto downlinkthealtitudesetin thealertervia datalink (Billings 1991).Like
theread-back,thiswouldpermitthecontroller(or theATC computer)to becertainthatthe
autoflightsystemhasbeensetto havethesameintentionasthepilotsandthatthepilotshavethe
sameintentionasthecontroller.Downlinkingthesettingof thealtitudealerterwouldprovide
anotheropportunityfor errordetectionasshowninFigure8. IncidentNo. 4 probablywouldhave
beendetectedearlierby thecontrollerif thealtitudepreselectwindowsettinghadbeendownlinked
to theATC computerandto thecontrollers'display.
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Figure 8. Additional check possible with downlinked value of the altitude alerter.
More Complex Machine-Readable Descriptions of Flight Path
Flying always involves a relationship between a pilot's mental description of the flight path and
the behavior of the airplane. With even the simplest autopilot, goals must be specified for the
automation. Even if they are no more than "maintain current altitude and speed," these goals must
be represented in a way that the machinery can make use of them. In more complex systems, such
as those found in the glass cockpit, a much wider range of goals, subgoals, and constraints can be
specified for the autoflight systems. In fact, aircraft with FMSs can now use a description of an
entire flight to guide an airplane from initial climbout on one coast to touchdown and rollout on the
runway on the opposite coast. If the crew of an automated airplane wishes the autoflight systems
to fly the flight path specified in a clearance, the clearance information must be translated into a
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form thatthemachinecanutilize. Themachine-readabledescriptionof theflight pathmustthenbe
linkedto theautoflightcomputers,andfinally theautoflightsystemsmustbelinked to thecontrol
surfacesof theairplane.
We havealreadydiscussedtheprocessesby whichtheinformationin thespokenclearance
makesits wayvia themindsof thepilotsto thealtitude-alerterdisplay. As wesaw,therearemany
opportunitiesfor errordetectionin theprocessof gettingthenumberinto thewindow. Thedisplay
becomesamemoryfor theclearedaltitude,but it maybemorethanthat. In aglasscockpit,the
altitudein thewindowmayalsobeanelementof amachine-readabledescriptionof flight path.
Theconstructionof suchdescriptionsis thenextmajorstepin theprocess.
ConsidernarrativeNo. 2:
Center cleared us to make a heading change to intercept a radial and cross 30
DME prior to the VOR at l l,O00 ft. I verified that we could make the restriction
and observed the first officer program the computer. The new first officer made
several errors in the fairly lengthy procedure which required a new waypoint, a
radial to the waypoint, crossing restrictions at the waypoint as well as a turn to
intercept the new course. Time became short, and as I attempted to assist him in
correcting his errors, I inadvertently inserted the wrong waypoint. (I inserted the
radial altitude rather than the radial/DME as the fix.) I then assisted the first officer
in accomplishing the procedure. I did not realize the error until we were leveling at
the waypoint and approach control asked us if center had given us the crossing
restriction.
This error emphasizes that the complex cockpit can, at times, be a hindrance
rather than an advantage. A constant verification of data and inputs is required.
The description of the flight path that must be entered into the control and display unit (CDU)
of the FMS is quite complicated. For example, the procedure described in this narrative would
require the following 14 steps in a typical glass cockpit:
1. Push the heading select button on the MCP and slew the heading bug to the intercept
heading. This disengages LNAV.
2. Enter 11,000 in the altitude alerter window on the MCP.
3. Enter the VOR identifier on the CDU scratch pad.
4. Line-select the VOR identifier to line 1 left of the RTE LEGS page.
5. Enter the inbound course to the scratch pad (this will be the reciprocal of the VOR radial
specified by ATC and the conversion will have to be made by the crew).
6. Line-select the specified inbound course to line 6 fight of the RTE LEGS page.
7. Execute the modifications to this point by pressing the CDU EXEC button.
8. Line-select the VOR back to the scratch pad and add the characters "/-30" to create a
waypoint 30 n. mi. prior to the VOR.
9. Line-select this new waypoint description on top of the VOR identifier in line 1 left.
10. Enter "/110" or "11000" in the scratch pad.
11. Line-select this to line 1 fight (adjacent to the newly created waypoint).
12. If necessary, close the route discontinuity following the VOR waypoint by selecting a
next on-route waypoint.
13. Execute the route modifications by pressing the CDU EXEC button.
14. Re-arm LNAV by pressing the LNAV button on the MCP.
The description that is entered into the FMC may be constructed from memory for the spoken
clearance, from the memory for the meaning of the clearance, and/or from a written record of the
clearance if one was made or from a combination of these (Fig. 9). The translation from the
spoken, written, and spatial representations into the input language of the FMS is mediated by
knowledge of the FMS language conventions. The entry of the description is executed through the
MCP and the FMS/CDU. Every step in the procedure described above entails a cycle of activity in
which the gulfs of execution and evaluation are bridged. The evaluation of character strings that
are entered with the CDU keypad is made on the CDU itself. The evaluation of the horizontal
component of the flight path description can be made graphically on the map display. No graphical
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displayis providedfor evaluatingtheverticalcomponentof theflight path,whichmustbe
evaluatedon thetext-basedCDU. Thisexampleshowsthaterrorsin theprogrammingcanbe
detectedby theotherpilot in thecockpit,whomaybemonitoringtheprogrammingactivity,or by
ATC whentheairplanefliesanunexpectedpath.
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Figure 9. Information flow in programming the FMS.
Our sample of altitude deviations contained several examples in which pilots appeared to have
difficulty bridging the gulf of execution and translating from a straightforward clearance in ATC
language to the flight path description required by the autoflight and flight-management systems.
There were also examples of problems bridging the gulf of evaluation where an error was made in
describing the clearance in the language of the FMS, but the crew was not aware that they had
made an error in entering the clearance until queried by the ATC controller. The map display is
useful for detecting gross errors such as route discontinuities in the horizontal flight path but is not
always helpful in detecting more subtle horizontal errors or errors in the vertical path. The current
FMSs do not help the pilots check to ensure that what they have entered in the CDU matches the
clearance that they received from ATC. Perhaps the FMS should translate what the pilot has input
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backintoATC language.Thismighthelpthepilot checkthatthedescriptionin theFMSmatches
theclearancefrom ATC.
Anothergulf-of-executionproblemwaswith theMCPfor theautopilot. TheFMS ispowerful
enoughto allowalmostanyclearanceto beenteredgivenenoughtime,butsomeof thealtitude
deviationsin oursamplecouldprobablyhavebeenavoidedif theautoflightMCP allowedthepilot
to inputconstraintson theaircraft'sairspeedduringalow-altitudeclimb andlevel-off.
Applying theconceptsof thegulf of executionandgulf of evaluationto theproblemsof
translatinganATCclearanceintoaflight pathdescriptionin theFMS is anotherwayof describing
thepilot's complaintinWiener'sfield studyabouttheincreasedworkloadrequiredto usethe
automaticequipmentin busyterminalareas.Thetaskof FMSpro_ammingtakestime,is mentally
absorbing,andrequirespilots togo "heads-down."Also, if onexsinterruptedin themiddleof a
programmingtask,it is oftendifficult to determinewhereonewasandhow to resumethetask.
Theexistenceof severaldifferentflight pathdescriptions(i.e.,languages)canmakeit difficult to
describethedesiredflight pathandincreasesthelikelihoodthaterrorswill bemadein describinga
flight pathto theautoflightsystem.17
Select Mode of Operation
Once elements of the flight path description have been entered in machine-readable form, there
remains a large number of possibilities for using the autoflight systems to realize the goals
expressed in the flight path description. Pilots may choose a combination of thrust, roll, and pitch
modes for the airplane, or may choose to disregard autoflight system computations and fly on "raw
data." Some modes may be armed, awaiting the existence of certain conditions before
automatically engaging, while others are engaged. This range of alternatives is too complicated to
permit a complete analysis here. Clearly, though, there are problems witfi the mapping from
intention to action in this element of the task.
The selections available on the MCP form a language of mode specification. Every possible
combination of settings on the MCP is a potential sentence in this language of mode specification.
The problem may be stated generally as one of knowing how to say what is wanted in this abstract
language. The gulf of execution must be bridged by determining which MCP settings will
accomplish the mode-selection goals. There are also problems on the side of the gulf of
evaluation. Instructors commonly complain that crews in training use the state of the MCP as part
of the evaluation of the mode status, when this is not appropriate. It is appropriate to refer to the
MCP to determine that the setting produced is the setting intended. In order to determine that the
setting produced on the MCP has actually engaged or armed the modes intended, it is necessary to
refer to the mode annunciators, which are not located on the MCP. These mode annunciators
represent autoflight status in yet another language which introduces even more cognitive
complexity to the cockpit.
Couple the Autoflight Computers to the Flight Controls
If an automated mode has been selected, the outputs of the autoflight computers can be coupled
to the flight controls in two ways. First, outputs of the autoflight computers can be used to drive
the flight director and the pilot can then use the manual flight-controls to produce the attitudes
indicated by the flight director command bars. Second, the outputs of the autoflight computers can
be sent to the autopilot servos that drive the flight control actuators. This second option is activated
by engaging one or more autopilots. Engaging an autopilot is another pilot action that requires
execution and evaluation. Execution is almost always straightforward; evaluation requires
monitoring autoflight status annunciators or the behavior of the airplane (Fig. 10).
17 The use of the term "programming" to describe this task is telling. Computer "programming" is notorious for
being mentally absorbing and costly to interrupt.
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Figure 10. Information flow in selecting the autopilot mode.
Supervise the Autoflight System
At this point, the autoflight system is or should be programmed to complete the altitude-capture
task automatically without pilot intervention. The crew's task is now one of supervising the
autoflight system. Supervision requires monitoring that the task is accomplished, possibly
adjusting the way the task is done, and intervening to modify the flight path if necessary. The
crew is accomplishing the altitude task as only one of many ongoing tasks. Crew members have to
divide their attention among all these tasks and insure that all critical functions are accomplished.
The altitude deviation described in narrative No. 1 illustrates that problems can still arise that
require the pilots have to intervene and modify the flight path. In this incident, turning off the
autopilot to stop the unintended turn also disabled the altitude capture. The pilots did not explicitly
modify any of the vertical modes on the MCP and there was no immediate change in aircraft
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behaviorin theverticaldimension.Thecrewhadto rememberthattheverticalpathwouldbe
affectedbydisengagingtheautopilotto stopthehorizontalturn.
Thiskind of ASRSincidenttogetherwithobservationsof pilot behaviorin full-mission
simulatorshasledusto hypothesizethatthepilot's primarysourcesof informationaboutthemode
of theautoflightsystemare(1) theexplicitselectionsmadeontheMCPand(2) thechangein
behaviorof theaircraft. Pilotsaretaughtthattheonly reliableindicatorof themodeof the
autoflightsystemis themodeannunciatordisplay.However,thehypothesisthatthemode
annunciatordisplayis usedasonly asecondarysourceof modeinformationprovidesapossible
explanationfor severalmode-awarenessproblemsthat wehaveobservedin ASRSreportsandin
full-missionsimulations.Peoplenaturallylearnexpectationsfor asystem'simmediateresponseto
their controlinputs. Problemsoccurwhencontrolinputscauseonly animmediatechangein the
modeannunciatordisplayandcauseno immediatechangein theflight pathof theaircraft.
In discussingdesigncharacteristicsthatmakehumanerrorsmorelikely, Norman(1986)uses
theterm"sideeffect" to refer toeventsthatoccurbut aresecondaryto theprimarypurposeof using
thesystem.Sideeffectsoftenresultin errors.Avoiding problemscausedby sideeffectsrequires
theusertorememberthatthesideeffecthasoccurredor will occurandtorememberto takeaction
to avoidtheusuallyunwantedconsequencesof thesideeffect. Oftensystemsprovidelittle support
in helpingusersrememberto checkfor sideeffects.For theflight crewin narrativeNo. 1,
disablingthealtitudecapturewasasideeffectof turningoff theautopilot.
DISCUSSION
In the preceding sections, narratives from ASRS reports were used to construct a descriptive
framework of the cockpit as a distributed cognitive system. We have traced Some of the paths
information can take as it moves from the controller to the flight crew and to the autoflight system
during the altitude-change task. We use the term distributed to emphasize that the cognitive
processing that is important to performance at the system level is distributed across the various
people in the system and the various artifacts and machines on the ground and in the cockpit. We
use the term cognitive to emphasize that the system achieves its goals and controls and monitors the
altitude-change task largely by processing information. The processing involves transmitting,
storing, accessing, checking, and cross-checking information represented in various media.
We refer to the active human and machine components of this distributed information
processing system as agents. In performing tasks, the agents in the system access information
stored on various media, and perform tests and transformations on the information and output
information and on actions to other media. The media in the system have different properties.
Each medium has a limited number of ways to represent information. Media also differ in their
storage properties. Information in an audio medium is only briefly available, whereas information
represented on the altitude-alerter display is available until the setting is changed. Media also differ
in their accessibility by other agents. The altitude-alerter display is centrally located and easily
accessible by both pilots, the CDU of one pilot is accessible with difficulty, and information on a
CDU page that is not displayed requires pilot input to the CDU to access. The pilots' memories are
also modeled as media. These media have representations that are likely to be unreliable and are
directly accessible by only one agent.
The key features of this system that make it error tolerant are that multiple agents have access to
clearance information, and agents can redundantly check to ensure that tasks are performed and that
information is processed correctly by the other agents in the system. Agents have expectations about
how information represented in one medium (the spoken clearance) will appear in another medium
(the MCP) and can use these expectations to detect and correct information processing errors.
The key features of this system that make it susceptible to breakdown are that it is constructed
of fallible agents (people) that may occasionally make errors in performing tasks or processing
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information.18Becauseof distractionsandlapsespeoplemayalsooccasionallyfail to performthe
checkingandcross-checkingtasksthatarenecessarytodetecttheseerrorsandthatgive theoverall
systemits error-tolerantproperties. Theterms"could," "should,"and"may" werefrequently
usedin theprecedingsectionwhendescribingcheckingandcross-checkingtasks.Oftenthese
tasksaregoodpractice,butdonothaveto bedonein orderthatthealtitude-changetaskbe
accomplishedcorrectly.
Feedback and Error Tolerance
Fundamental to reliably performing any task without error by humans or by machines is the
concept of feedback and checking. In general, feedback involves comparing the actual state of a
controlled system with the desired state of the system. When a mismatch is detected, action is
taken to reduce the mismatch. The need for feedback in aviation tasks is most apparent in
continuous-control tasks such as continually detecting and compensating for path errors while
manually flying an instrument approach. In continuous-control tasks, errors are an expected part
of doing the task and displays are designed to clearly display errors and to make error detection and
error compensation straightforward.
In the diagram of a continuous-control system (Fig. 11), feedback from the actual state to the
desired state forms the "loop" that is the basis for the phrase "in the loop" that is used to describe
the desirable state of being actively involved in the process and of having good situation
awareness. Discrete tasks such as setting the cleared altitude into the altitude alerter are usually
done without error and the need for feedback is not as apparent, but feedback and checking are
necessary for any discrete or continuous task to be done consistently without error.
Goal: Error Control ...... Actual
Desired State ............... state
Controller _ System II
Feedbackiii_ !ii!iiii_ii_i_ii_i_ _ _
Figure 11. A simple servomechanism.
Distributed Access to Information
Multiple people and machines in the cockpit and on the ground are involved in performing the
checking and cross-checking tasks associated with making an altitude change. Hutchins and
Klausen (1991) describe how the pilots' distributed access to information and each pilot's
expectations of what events should occur during an altitude change result in error detection and
correction. Even though it is usually the PNF's responsibility to communicate with ATC, the other
crew members are usually also monitoring the ATC frequency in order to know the current
18 These errors may be caused by any number of factors including lack of attention, lack of knowledge, or equipment
design that increases the likelihood of human errors. Equipment design that reduces the likelihood of human
error is termed error-resistant design (Billings 1991).
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clearanceandto checkfor communicationerrors.Oursampleof altitude-deviation incidents
included several examples in which one pilot was off the ATC frequency and failed to pick up a
communication error made by the other pilot. When an ATC clearance with a new altitude is
received, one of the pilots enters it into the altitude-alerter window. This provides the command
altitude for the autopilot, but just as importantly it provides information about the cleared altitude to
the altitude alerter that allows machine monitoring of the altitude-change task and the same
information to the other pilot to allow human monitoring of the autoflight system.
Distractions
Distractions can cause failures in both execution tasks and evaluative checking tasks.
However, checking tasks seem to be much more likely to be disrupted or skipped because of a
distraction (Monan 1979). There is rarely an obvious penalty for not performing a checking task.
If the flight path is described correctly and the automation functions correctly, the evaluative
checking and cross-checking tasks do not have to be accomplished correctly, or at all, for error-
free performance at the system level. The checking and cross-checking tasks provide the error-
tolerant characteristics of the system that accomplishes the altitude-change task. In an error-tolerant
system, checking tasks detect many errors and result in normal error free operation as viewed by
an external observer. These tasks provide opportunities to detect and correct errors. They provide
the redundancy necessary for the normal externally observable error-free execution of the altitude-
change task.
Checking tasks that provide error-tolerant properties seem to be particularly susceptible to not
being done or to being done incorrectly as a result of allocating attention to apparently more
important tasks that can not be done correctly without focused pilot attention. However these
interrupting "primary" tasks may actually be less important in terms of overall safe operation than
the checking or cross-checking task. Pilots might even agree that performing the checking task is
of higher priority than performing a primary task, but their behavior may not always accord with
those priorities. For example, most pilots would agree that making the "thousand-feet-to-go" call
is more important than talking to ATC or to their company, but we are sure that observations of
cockpit behavior would show many instances when these "lower" priority tasks take precedence
over more important safety-of-flight checking and cross-checking tasks.
Checking tasks are good practice, but may not necessarily be prescribed behavior. In a desire
to reduce the number of altitude deviations in its fleet, one air carrier has formally implemented
explicit crew procedures for making altitude changes (Sumwalt 1991). For example, the following
is the mandated procedure for receiving a clearance and setting the altitude window:
Pilot accepting clearance will set altitude alerter/MCP (normally pilot not
flying). S/he will announce and point to the new altitude until the other pilot
(normally pilot flying) observes and repeats the assigned altitude. Cross cockpit
verification is a must. LOOK AT IT.
A key feature of these procedures is that they mandate how and when checking and cross-
checking tasks are to be accomplished. The procedures also require overt responses in tasks that
otherwise could be done with only an eye scan. The overt verbal and gestural responses help
insure that each pilot knows that the other pilot is aware of the new assigned altitude. The fact that
each pilot knows that the other pilot knows the cleared altitude improves the likelihood of detecting
errors. The explicit nature of the procedures should also improve each pilot's expectations of how
the other pilot should behave during the altitude-change task. Good expectations are necessary for
detecting errors by observing deviations from expected behavior. If it is not clear what the other
crew member is supposed to do, it is difficult to know if the other crew member's behavior is
correct or incorrect.
When check and cross-check tasks are not accomplished, tasks may still be accomplished
correctly but they will be accomplished with less than the desired amount of redundancy. Crews
may not be sensitive to the implications of the loss of these redundant checks on system safety.
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Intelligent Feedback
A controversial question concerning cockpit design is whether the visual approaching-altitude
alert should be accompanied by an aural signal. An early study on altitude deviations (Factors...
1977) noted that many pilots reported that the aural alert sounded so often that they frequently did
not hear it. That report recommended that the aural alert be made optional in future aircraft. Now
ASRS reports are received that blame reported altitude deviations on the lack of an aural alert.
Lyddane (1991 ) has proposed providing the aural approaching-altitude signal only if the altitude that
is set in the altitude alerter will be violated if the pilot does not take immediate action to reduce the
aircraft's vertical rate. The alert would be triggered based on a linear relationship between vertical
rate and altitude to go. It would be essentially a ground-proximity-warning system (GPWS) 19 for
altitude deviations. An alert would not sound if the autoflight system performed the altitude change
in the usual, expected way. Such an alert would be triggered on only the rare occasions that positive
action was required to prevent a deviation. Unlike the current altitude-deviation warning, this alert
would sound in time to prevent the deviation. This is the kind of intelligent feedback (Norman
1990) that systems must provide to support the flight crew in their more supervisory tasks. Many
autoflight systems would not rate well on cockpit resource management (CRM) criteria for being an
effective subordinate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
ASRS reports provide a window on problems that are occurring in today's aviation system.
They are useful in identifying problems and stimulating ideas for correcting current problems.
Procedures
Procedures for doing the checking and cross-checking tasks during the altitude-change task
should be formalized. A good example of how one airline has done this is described in the paper
by Sumwah (1991). Error tolerance depends on distributed access to information by "agents" that
have expectations about correct behavior. Explicit procedures help by allowing crew members to
have stronger expectations about the behavior of other crew members and by providing explicit
behavioral signs so that each pilot knows that the other pilot knows the current cleared altitude.
Cockpit procedures should be designed to minimize the amount of time when only one pilot is
on the radios. Unless both pilots hear the clearance, they cannot redundantly monitor the
communication for errors.
Training
Several ASRS reports from pilots of glass cockpit aircraft indicate that pilots could use more
training on how to use the many features of the complex autoflight and FMSs in glass cockpit
aircraft. A specific recommendation is that pilots be provided with a selection of ASRS reports that
illustrate the kinds of problems that can occur when using autoflight equipment.
Curriculum designers could use ASRS reports to determine the kinds of problems that pilots
are having in line operations with autoflight and FMSs and then tailor initial and recurrent training
to emphasize these problem areas.
New Equipment: Datalink
The use of datalink for ATIS, company communications, and weather information should reduce
communication errors and increase the time during which all pilots are monitoring the, ATC frequency.
The use of datalink has some potential advantage for the display of ATC clearances. Datalinked
clearances could be displayed on a printed medium instead of through an auditory medium. Printed
19The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) provides a predictive alert, based in part on radar altitude and
vertical velocity, that inadvertent contact with the ground is imminent.
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mediahavetheadvantagethatinformationenduresand,unlikewithauditorymedia,pilotscan
controlwhentheywill attendto theinformation.Theclearanceinformationis alsoin acomputer-
readableformatthatcouldbeinputdirectlyto theautoflightandflight managementsystemsthus
reducingentry timeandthepossibilityof keyingerrors. However,theuseof datalinkfor clearance
deliverywill requirecarefulattentionto thedesignof cockpitproceduresto insurethatwhenavisual
mediumreplacesthecurrentauditorymediaall crewmembersareawareof ATC clearance
communications.Proceduresuchasthatreportedby Sumwahmaybeevenmoreimportantin a
datalinkenvironmenthanin today'slargelyvoicecommunicationsystem.
Theuseof datalinktoclosetheintentloopbetweenair andgroundshouldbeinvestigated.By
downlinkingthealtitudethatthepilot hassetinto thealtitudealerteranddisplayingit on the
controller'sdisplay,it is possiblefor thecontroller(or agroundcomputersystem)to monitor
redundantlythattheflight crewhasreceivedandsetthealtitudealerterwith thecorrectaltitude. This
is anexampleof thecommunication-of-intentinformationbetweenair crewandair-trafficcontroller
thatis advocatedby Billings (1991).
Future Design Possibilities
More Intelligent Feedback
The issue of whether to provide an aural alert when the aircraft is approaching the altitude set in
the altitude alerter should be revisited. A more intelligent audio alert, such as that proposed by
Lyddane (1991) that only sounds if an altitude deviation is imminent, would appear to alert pilots to
an approaching altitude deviation without either sounding so often in routine situations that pilots
start to ignore it or come to rely on it as their primary source of altitude information.
Displays
The gulfs of execution and evaluation should be reduced with electronic map enhancements such
as the green arc, DME circles around navigational fixes, and energy circles. These allow pilots to
control and monitor vertical profiles with little or no FMS programming. Research should also be
done on a vertical analog of the horizontal map display to help the pilot access, plan, and monitor for
vertical path errors (Baty and Watkins 1979; Fadden et al. 1991).
Primary Flight Displays
Primary flight displays should be developed that make busting an altitude perceptually dramatic.
With current displays almost nothing visual happens. The altitude-alert system provides a "dimly lit
light" (narrative No. 7). Otherwise, the task of monitoring the level-off involves comparing the
altitude displayed on the altimeter with the reference value stored in a different location. The altitude
bugs on the tape altimeters are a step in the right direction. The tunnel-in-the-sky display would
seem to provide a more explicit indication that the aircraft has busted or is about to bust its altitude
(Grunwald 1981; 1984). Busting an altitude should be as perceptually dramatic as failing to make a
turn planned in your automobile on an expressway.
CONTINUING RESEARCH
In several ASRS reports, pilots in our sample mentioned fatigue caused by long duty days and
insufficient sleep as a factor contributing to reported altitude deviations. There is an on-going
research program at NASA Ames on the effects of flying schedules on flight crew sleep loss and on
pilot performance. Studies of ASRS incident reports are being performed that focus on the link
between pilot fatigue and aircraft incidents. A full-mission simulator study is planned to evaluate
flight crew performance after a multiday mission.
A computational model of the information processing in a transport cockpit during the descent
and approach phases of flight is being constructed. This model will focus on the flow of information
among the various people and machines in the system. The agents in the model will have behavioral
expectations that allow them to monitor the tasks and information processing of the other agents and
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machinesin thesystem.Thiscomputationalmodelwill beusedto analyzetheinformationflow
duringaltitudechangesmadein well-documentedfull-missionflight simulations.
CONCLUSION
In this report we took an information processing approach to describingthe system that performs
the altitude-change task, Our unit of an'_ysis was the cockpit system, not the Individual pilot, We
were concerned With how the system processes, stores, and makes decisions as it processes
clearance information, Narratives from altitude-deviation reports were used to help construct a
descriptive model of the cockpit as an information processing system, Incident data are particularly
useful in helping to reveal how the system processes information.
We focuSed=on describing the error-tolerant properties of the system and why breakdowns
,occasionally occur, An error-tolerant system is a system that is capable of detecting and correcting
Its intema!processing errors, The cockpit system consists of twoor three pilots supported by
autoflight, flight-management, and ale_ng systems, These human and machine agents have
distributed access to clearance information and perform redundant processing of information. Errors
can be detected as deviations from either expected behavior or as deviations from expected
information, Breakdowns in this system are possible because the checking and cross-checking tasks
that give the system its error-tolerant properties may not be performed owing to distractions, fatigue,
or other task demands, Monitoring and checking tasks are not required in order to accomplish the
altitude-change task, and there is almost never a performance penalty for not performing checking
tasks.
Describing the cockpit as a single information-processing system is useful because the system
behav!ors of interest are not determined solely by the behavior Of the humans in the system. Altitude
deviations m transport aircraft are usually the result of multiple errors, The information processing
analysis also highhghts the variety of languages and media used to describe the flight path as
clearance tnfo_ati0n moves through thecockpit system.
The properties of the error-tolerant systems provide a justification for several our
recommendations, More explicit procedures allow each pilot to have better expectations about what
tasks the other pilot will perform and the information that the other pilot knows. More effective
training should also provide pilots with better expectations of how the autoflight and FMSs work, In
addition to reductng errors, this knowledge should allow pilots to be more effective in detecting
programming errors. The expanded use of datalink for nonATC information would minimize the
time that one pilot is unable to monitor the communications with the air-traffic controller, The use of
datalink for clearances will result in a more persistent error-free medium, but the change to datalink
for clearance deliverywil! require new cockpit procedures to insure that both pilots are aware of the
current clearance, Using datalink to downlink Selected values, such as the value in the altitude-a!erter
window, offers a channel for closing the intent loop between air and ground, This downlink would
provide a redundant means for the controller (or a ground system) to monitor the altitude to which
the crew is intending to fly, The recommendation for a GPWS-!ike altitude alert offers the potential
of improving the altitude aierter's monitoring performance, With thepredictive logic proposed by
L),ddane, the system could provide an alert as soon as the flight path deviated from the expected
flight path to capture the selected altitude.
Finally the information ,processing approach led us to the observation that there are several
sources ofautoflight mode reformation in the cockpit and then to the hypothesis that mode-control
acttons on the MCP and the aircraft's behavior may be more salient clues to autoflight mode than the
flight mode annunciator display.
Over 8,000 a!titude deviations are reported to the ASRS each year--nearly one an hour. It is
hoped that analyzing the way information is processed by the cockpit system will lead to procedural
or design changes that will help reduce the number of these incidents.
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